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DICKINSON LIV REVIEVV

RECENT CASES
GIFTS - GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS - DELIVERY

-

INFORMAL

WRITING AS SUBSTITUTE FOR DELIVERY
The recent New Jersey case of Foster et al. v. Reiss1 dealt with a controversy
between personal representatives and trustees (daughter and son-in-law) of the
deceased and the deceased's husband concerning the disposition of some cash and
two bank accounts of the deceased. The husband appealed the judgment of the
lower court.
The deceased was a patient, awaiting surgery, in a hospital in the city of her
residence. Shortly before she was taken to the operating room, she asked her roommate, a friend for many years, for paper and pencil. Upon completing a letter to
her husband informing him of the location of various sums of money and two
bank books in their home, she placed the letter in her desk drawer. She then asked
her roommate to inform her husband or daughter of the letter when they came in
and to instruct them to take it. That afternoon the husband obtained the letter when
informed of it, and on the same day he took possession of and retained the bank
books and the money. This gift contradicted the donor's probated will made eleven
years previous thereto wherein she had given $1.00 to her husband and the remainder to her children and grandchildren. In 1947, Mr. Reiss had signed a separation
agreement waiving curtesy in his wife's property. The trial court defeated the attempted gift on the basis of insufficient delivery.

The upper court set out the following requisites for both inter vivos and causa
mortis gifts:
/ a present donative intention,
W12 delivery of the subject of the gift, unless it be a chose in action

in whi

event the delivery must be of that variety of which it is most

capable, and
(3) the donor must part with all dominion over it.
As previously mentioned, the fulfillment of the delivery requisite is in issue.
We are concerned with only a very limited aspect of delivery of gifts causa mortis.
The question is, where a donor attempts to make a gift causa mortis by an informal
writing which is delivered to the donee or to a third party for the donee without
an actual delivery of the gift res is the delivery requisite satisfied?
Most courts and authorities note the danger implicit in recognizing gifts causa
2
mortis without requiring the most convincing evidence to substantiate that gift,
and thus a bulwark of safeguards has been imposed around these gifts. (In the re1 107 A.2d 24 (1954).
2 Typical of the comments of the courts is this statement in Sheegog v. Perkins, 63 Tenn. 273,

281, in regard to gifts causa mortis. "it is said that too much care cannot be taken in insisting on

the most convincing evidence in cases of this kind, for these donations do amount to a revocation,
pro tanto, of written wills and not being subject to forms prescribed for nuncupative wills they are

certainly of a dangerous nature."
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mainder of the article when the word gift is used it refers to gift causa mortis).
It is necessary to weigh carefully the restrictions and requirements of gifts as contrasted with the apparent equity of allowing the donor's supposed intent to be
acknowledged.
The death of the donor is required to validate the gift, and since that death
silences the one whose intent must be determined, there is much opportunity for
fraud, mistake or exertion of undue influence on the donor.8 There is often a question in regard to the lucidity of the donor while ill and awaiting death. Also, when
donations are made hurriedly on death beds as contrasted to properly witnessed and
executed wills, composed after considerable thought and effort, it seems proper
to view these gifts with caution. On the other hand, one often perceives true friendship with time, and it is fitting that a grateful person have a means to express his
appreciation to those who have stood by them.
In the case under discussion, the donor had written and signed a letter to
her husband indicating the location of various items and expressing her desire
that they be his. It was agreed that the donor was mentally competent, had not been
importuned for a gift and had acted spontaneously. The Superior Court of New
Jersey reversed the holding of the trial court and awarded the gift to the husband,
justifying its decision on the ground that that the delivery was as nearly perfect and
complete as possible and relying on New York and New Jersey case law. The
court notes that no other court has decided a case exactly in point.
The law in New Jersey cannot be deemed to be settled on this point. In
Cook v. Lum, 4 in discussing gifts, the court said:

"With regard to the former class,-that is things corporeal-there
must be, in addition to the expression of a donative purpose, an actual
tradition of the corpus of the gift, whenever considering the nature of the
property and the circumstances of the actors, such a formality is reasonably
practicable."
In Weiss v. Fenwick,5 the court stated as follows:
"The delivery must be such as is actual, unequivocal, and complete
during the lifetime of the donor, wholly divesting him of the possession,
dominion, and control thereof."
Are these requisites fulfilled in this case?
In two other New Jersey casts cited by the court it is agreed that a deed of gift
may be substituted for a manual delivery of the gift. In neither case is there a
discussion of informal instrument, but it is stated that a deed suffices due to its
6
solemnity of execution and its legal efficacy.
The delivery was more dearly made out, and the informal instrument was
8 Parker v. Copland, 70 N.J. Eq. 685, 64 At!. 129 (1906) ; Napier v. Eigel, 350 Mo. 111, 117, 164
S. W.2d 908, 912 (1942).
4 55 N.J. 373, 26 At!. 803 (1893).
5 111 N.J. Eq. 385, 162 Ad. 609 (1932).
6 Tarbox v. Grant, 56 N.J. Eq. 199, 39 Atl. 378 (1898); Meyers v, Meyers, 99 N.J. Eq. 560, 134

Ad. 95 (1926).
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usually strongly substantiated in the New York cases cited in the opinion. For
example, in McGavic v. Cossum,7 a gift inter vivos was recognized on an informal

writing where the donor was ill in a hospital and the bonds that were to be given
were in a safe deposit box in a city about forty miles away. It was definitely impracticable for the donor to transfer the bonds manually.
In Hillary Holding Corporation v. Brooklyn Jockey Club,8 the letter of gift
was substantiated by other letters and records.
In the case of In re Cohn, 9 the donor in the presence of his entire family indicated his intention, later evidenced by an informal writing, to make a gift of stocks
he did not then own and could not have delivered. The court recognized the gift
as valid on a three-two decision, with a vigorous dissent. The court stated:
"Delivery by the donor, either actual or constructive, operating to
divest the donor of possession and dominion over the thing, is a constant
and essential factor in every transaction which takes effect as a completed
gift. Anything short of this strips it of the quality of completeness,
which distinguishes an intention to give, which alone amounts to nothing,
from the consumated act, which changes the title. The intention to give
is often established by the most satisfactory evidence, although the gift
fails. Instruments may be ever so formally executed by the donor, purporting to transfer title to the donee, or there may be the most explicit declaration of an intention to give, or of an actual present gift, yet unless
there is delivery the intention is defeated."
In two other New York cases which were not cited by the court, informal
writings were recognized as valid, but in one of the cases 10 the court did not
authenticate its statement, and in the other,' the writing was substantiated by
the donee's possession of the gift res.
It is evident that it is difficult to reach a proper and just decision in cases
of this type. Many factors need be considered, including the relationship of the
parties, prior disposition by will, mental condition of the donor, the nature of the
gift and a true inability to place one's hands on the corpus of the gift.
Although it is difficult to deny the clarity of the donor's intent and that she
did her present utmost to execute the gift, is there not justification for saying she
might yet have done more? She might, for example, have had her roommate witness
her letter, or after her operation, being still bedfast for nine days, have accorded
some further recognition to strengthen the gift.
Under the circumstances the decision appears to be reasonably just, but although the court says that the safeguards surrounding these gifts are not relaxed,
this writer feels that to recognize the validity of informal writings in regard to
substituting them for delivery is a relaxation of those safeguards and should be
7
8
9
10
11

72 App. Div. 35, 76 N.Y. Supp. 305 (1902).
88 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1949).
187 App. Div. 392, 176 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1919).
In re Roosevelts Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1947).
In re Goodwins Estate, 185 N.Y. Supp. 461 (1920).
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recognized as such. Should these safeguards be relaxed? In Parker v. Copland12
the court said:
"Of all the legal rules, however, those that have grown up around
the doctrine of donatio causa mortis should be the least subject to relaxation."
In a Michigan case' s in 1943 the court stated:
"It must be remembered that gifts are often questioned after death
has sealed the lips of the donor and that there is no legal limit to the
amount which may be disposed of by means of them. Thus, to insure
against fraud and perjury, the requirement of actual delivery, or its
equivalent if the chattel be not capable of actual delivery, is the only substantial protection, and courts should not weaken the necessary element
of delivery by permitting the substitution of convenient and easily proven
devices."
The above quotations indicate the necessity for retention of those safeguards.
In regard to this problem, the authorities and the courts are in confusion and
are contradictory. The saying, the law is in a state of flux, is apt here, as will be
indicated by a hasty survey of a few jurisdictions and some prominent legal writings. Part of the confusion results from the loose usage of the words, deeds and
formal instruments, and some is due to the conflicting explanations of the methods
by which writings transfer the ownership to the donee.
In Pennsylvania it appears that the courts have not been met with the problem
of determining the efficacy of an informal writing. Early cases recite the necessity
for caution in regard to gifts. 14 In American Oil Company v. Falconer,'5 it was
stated that where manual delivery of the subject of the gift is not practicable, a
transfer may be made by assignment or other writing or token. The court cites
Mardis v. Steen' as the basis for this holding. That case although not differentiating between informal and formal writings apparently means the latter.
In Cannon v. Williams,17 a Georgia case, the court noted that the sufficiency
of an informal writing to pass title where manual delivery is impossible or impracticable is recognized in that state although some of the decisions are out of
line with it. In South Carolina, the court in Lynch v. Lynch' s cites 63 A.L.R.
537 with approval, to this effect:
"It is generally held where the paper is neither a deed, a sealed instrument nor a formal instrument purporting to pass title, but is only an
that the instruinformal instrument, such as a letter, order, or memo,
ment is ineffective as a gift without a delivery oof the property."
In Nevada, in 1922, a gift was allowed where the donor made a written
12 70 N.J. Eq. 685, 64 At. 129 (1906).
13 Molenda v. Simpson, 307 Mich. 139, 11 N. W.2d 835.

14 Headley v. Kirby, 6 Harris 326 (1852); Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. 59 (1854).
16 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939).
16 293 Pa. 13, 141 Atd. 629 (1928).
17 194 Ga. 808, 22 S. E.2d 838 (1942).
18 201 S.C. 130, 21 S. E.2d 569 (1942).
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declaration of a gift of liberty bonds because of the service the donee had given
him. The donor also gave the donee an order on the bank to deliver the bonds
to him, and orally informed a third party of the gift. 19 The court stated:
"A gift causa mortis is not aided by the execution of the written
instrument, except so far as that may contribute to greater certainty in
the proofs. Such gifts cannot be effected by formal instruments of conveyance and assignment. They are manifested by, and take their effect
from delivery."
This was also stated in Knight v. Tripp 20 in California in 1898 and was
cited with approval in Yates v. Dundas21 in 1947.
Brown, a paramount authority on personal property law, recognizes the confusion of the courts. He holds the traditional view to be that an informal writing
is ineffective but that a majority of the courts seem to recognize the validity of
gifts by ordinary writings.22 In a later section, in regard to both sealed and informal instruments, he states:
"Because of the close similarity between such instruments and the
written will it may be argued that such instruments are invalid unless
executed with the formalities of signature, publication, and attestation
required of testamentary dispositions. As has been seen, however, there
is but little juricial authority for treating the causa
mortis gift any differ28
ently than the inter vivos gift in this respect."
Contrast Brown with 63 A.L.R. 555, where the following appears:
"(c) Instruments other than deeds or sealed instruments. As applied to
writings other than deeds or sealed instruments the weight of authority
dearly favors the view that writing is ineffective as a gift causa mortis
without a delivery of the property."
Compare American Jurisprudence2 ' which affirms the rule that informal
writings are not sufficient to convey gifts without delivery of the gift res but
point out that there are courts which do permit a gift by informal writing when
delivery of the property is impossible or impracticable.
Finally, the following is quoted from "Readings on Personal Property", by
25
Fryer:
"(a) Where a statute abolishes seals, or abolishes the distinction
between sealed and unsealed instrumnts, or otherwise changes the common law operation of the seal, and such statute has been interpreted by
the courts of the jurisdiction as making conveyances of realty without seal
valid, an unsealed written conveyance of a chattel should be valid as a
gift.
Goldsworthy v. Johnson, 45 Nev. 355, 204 Pac. 505 (1922).
121 Cal. 674, 54 Pac. 267-269 (1898).
182 P.2d 305 (1947).
Brown, Personal Property, § 46, p. 111-114, (1936).
Brown, Personal Property, § 52, p. 138, (1936).
24 24 Am. Jur. § 36, p. 757.
25 Fryer, Readings on Personal Property, p. 857, (3rd ed., 1938).
19

20
21
22
28
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"(b) Where no such legislation exists, the efficacy of gifts by deed
must be held to lie where it lay at common law, in the intrinsic qualities
of the seal, and the absence of the seal renders the writing no more
potent than any other parol expression of donative intent, i.e., quite impotent in the absence of a delivery of the chattel. This, however, subject
to the following consideration.
"(c) The common law being in a constant state of flux and subject
to change by judicial decision, it is of course quite possible that a new
doctrine relative to gifts may be developed or has been developed in some
jurisdictions, making a mere writing operative to effect a gift without
delivery, the writing acting, not as a deed, and in no way deriving its
oVency from the law of deeds, but operatin$ proprio vigore, simply
y reason of its inherent functional suitability.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of this writer that if informal instruments
are to suffice as substitutes for delivery, they should do so only where their authenticity is unquestionable. They should be limited to those instruments which clearly
indicate a present intent to give and are explicit in denoting the gift res. Further,
they should be valid only in those situations where there is an actual incapability
to manually transfer the property due to a true impossibility or impracticality.
Robert M. Keim
Member of the Middler Class

TORT - PUBLIC CHARITIES - LIABILITY - CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY RULE - NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT
The Supreme Court of Washington, in a line of decisions dating back to
1893,1 uniformly held that a charitable hospital was not liable for the negligence
of its employees in treating a patient. Whether the patient paid or not, was immaterial.
This charitable immunity rule persisted for sixty years and was finally reversed2
in the recent case of Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association,
where it was held that a charitable non-profit hospital may b'e held liable for injuries to paying patients caused by the negligence of its employees.
The basis of the charitable immunity doctrine, not only in Washington, but in
Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions which adhere to it, is the so-called trust fund
theory. The substance of this theory is that charitable institutions derive most of
their money from private contributions which they hold "in trust" for the benefit
of the general public. If the charity is forced to compensate injured parties for the
negligence of its agents or servants, the trust fund would be diverted for purposes
never intended by the donor, and the charitable purposes of the organization would
1 Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 6 Wash. 52, 32 Pac. 1012 (1893).

2 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
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be frustrated. Thus, the individual injured by the negligence, however gross, of an
agent or servant of a charitable institution has no cause of action against it.
The trust fund thory, as the basis of charitable immunity, had its origin in
England in the dictum of Lord Cottenham in Feofees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross,3
decided in 1846. However, this theory was repudiated and directly overruled in
1871 by Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbary.4 Thus, it is no longer the law even in
the jurisdiction where it originated. Even more interesting is the fact that the first
American case to quote the trust fund theory of Lord Cottenham, was decided in
Massachusetts in 1876.r Thus, the Massachusetts court resurrected the theory five
years after it was repudiated in England, the land of its birth.
In repudiating this hoary old ghost, the court in the Pierce case points out
that it simply does not stand up in the light of present day thinking. Changed
conditions have rendered that type of reasoning obsolete. The state has become
more or less paternalistic toward charitable institutions. Hospitals today are big
business. They own and hold large assets, most of them tax free. This change in
financial backing does not reflect discredit upon the institutions or their public
spirited backers. It is simply a product of changed economic conditions and new
concepts of public responsibility. Significantly, the court takes judicial notice of
the existence and extensive use of liability insurance. Practically all modern hospitals as well as other charitable institutions avail themselves of the protection, at
moderate cost, of liability insurance. In view of this, it is stretching the imagination
greatly to say that money damages will be paid out of charitable trust funds.
The doctrine has also been strongly disapproved on the ground that when an
organization such as a hospital is created for certain purposes which cannot be executed without the exercise of care and skill, it becomes the duty of the organization
to exercise such care and skill.6
In administering the coup de grace to the trust fund theory, the court makes
an examination of states in which the immunity rule does not prevail, and it does
not find a single case of undue hardship befalling a charity. By compiling a nationwide box score as of the date of the Pierce case, it was shown that twenty six states
would grant immunity, eighteen states, the District of Columbia and the territories
of Alaska and Puerto Rico7 would refuse it and four states would be in doubt because
of no reported decisions.
8

12 Clark and Fin. 507, 518, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
4 LR 6 QB 214 (1871).
5 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
6 10 Am. Jur. 695.
7 Those that would grant immunity are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming all in varrying degrees. Those that would deny immunity include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Nor Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Tennessee,
Utah and Vermont. The questionable states include: Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota and Hawaii.
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Since 1943, four states and Puerto Rico have abandoned the charitable immunity rule,8 three other states and Alaska have rejected it as a matter of first impression, 9 and no appellate court since 1943 has joined the group favoring immunity.
In affirming the doctrine of the Pierce case, Kansas, in 1954,10 reversed itself
and joined the trend toward abandoning the rule. Wisconsin, while not abandoning
it, has recently criticized it severely. 1 The latter court stated that it believes the
reasons for granting immunity to charities are archaic, and if the court were not
bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, it would probably reverse.
It might be noted in this respect that if the courts lean too heavily upon the
doctrine of stare decisis, our law would never change, and we would be in a state
of stagnation. The courts might well ask themselves whether stare decisis was intended to perpetuate a rule which may have been wrong when it was first adopted
and in any event has long outlived its usefulness.
The leading Pennsylvania case in regard to hospitals is very similar to the
Pierce case in every respect except the result. In both the Pierce case and Gable v.
Sisters of St. Francis,'2 a paying patient was injured due to the negligence of a
nurse. In the Gable case, recovery against the charitable hospital was denied even
though the plaintiff disclaimed any right of execution against any fund held for
charitable uses and all income other than that received from the paying patients.
The court said:
"It is a doctrine too well established in our own state as in any other,
and is unequivocally declared, that a public charity cannot be made liable
for the torts of its servants."
In supporting the trust fund theory, the court cites th-e oldest and perhaps most
famous Pennsylvania case in this area, Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 13 decided in
1.886, wherein the court stated:
"It would be against all law and equity to take those trust funds
so contributed for a special charitable purpose to compensate injuries inflicted or occasioned by the negligence of the agents or servants of the
patrol. The law jealously guards a charitable trust fund and does not permit it to be frittered away by the negligent acts of those employed in its
execution."
8 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951) ; Baptist Hospital v. Holmes,
214 Miss. 906, 55 So.2d 151 (1951) ; Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Assn., 241 Iowa 1269, 45
N. W.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Travez
v. San Jose Lodge, 68 Puerto Rico 681.
9 Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 83 A.2d 753 (1951) ; Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital,
74 N.D. 525, 23 N. W.2d 247 (1946) ; Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124,
70 A.2d 230 (1950) ; Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska 546.
10 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
11 Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N. W.2d 896 (1953).
12 227 Pa. 254, 75 At. 1087 (1910).
1s 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1886).
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In commenting on the plaintiff's intention of seeking damages only
from those funds received from paying patients, the court brushed it aside with a
heavy hand, declaring, "Every dollar received from whatever source is stamped
with the impress of charity."
Thus, it is clear that ever since 1886, Pennsylvania has refused to permit a
charitable institution to be liable for the negligence of its servants and agents.
The last time our Supreme Court dealt with charitable immunity, in Bond v.
Pittsburgh,14 the rule was affirmed as follows:
"Notwithstanding the violent criticisms that have been directed by
academic legal writers against the doctrine of the immunity of charitable
organizations from tort liability, and notwithstanding also the fact that
there is a considerable conflict in the judicial decisions on the subject
among the several states, our own Commonwealth has, from the earliest
times, stood firm in its adherence to the principle of immunity."
The dissenting opinion in this case, however, is more realistic. It criticizes the
trust fund theory because actually the funds do not dry up when the cloak of immunity is withdrawn, as is shown by four states, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
York and Rhode Island, which have withdrawn it. Just as in the Pierce case, it
points out that, "The professed fear of dissipation of trust funds is more fancied
than real in these modern days where that danger is usually guarded against by
liability insurance." As a matter of fact, in the Bond case, the charity was covered
by such insurance.
Besides the trust fund theory and stare decisis argument, the court states that
any change should come from the legislature. The answer to this, was very effectively pointed out in the Pierce case. Since, in the first instance, it was the court
and not the legislature which formulated this rule, the court should also take the
initiative in discarding it when it has outlived its usefulness. The court in the
Pierce case concludes by saying:
"There is today no factual justification for immunity and principles
of law, logic and intrinsic justice demand that immunity be withdrawn."
An interesting sidelight on the Pierce case is that there seems to have be-en a
slip of the judicial tongue. By its language the court holds charitable hospitals
liable for injuries to paying patients. Does this mean that the old rule
still applies to patients who pay nothing? This point is seized upon in the
dissenting opinion. It would seem, however, from the thorough, painstaking way
the court maneuvers in rejecting the rule, by discarding every basis upon which it
formerly stood, that its intent was to reject it in toto.

14 368 Pa. 407, 84 At. 328 (1951).
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A very recent case on the subject, is Allison v. Mennonite PublicationsBoard.1"
This case was not decided in our supreme court, but in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In applying Pennsylvania law,
under the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 16 the court cited the Bond, Gable
and Boyd cases as it stated:
"The rule of charitable immunity has been held to be a strong public
policy in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It is a doctrine too well
established to be shaken that a public charity cannot be held liable for the
tort of its servants."
In conclusion, clearly, the trend is toward repudiating this outmoded rule
which has long outlived its usefulness. One by one, the states are recognizing the
economic facts of life and are re-examining their positions, a step which leads, in
every case, to discarding the rule. When Pennsylvania will do so, is unknown.
Only time will tell.
Robert G. Meiners
Member of the Middler Class
1' 123 F. Supp. 23 (1954).
16 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 144 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).

